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Article

Conflicting Visions and Contested
Baselines: Intellectual Property and Free
Speech in the "Digital Millennium"
Daniel A. Farbert
"Make no mistake: The digital age will change the meaning of
freedom of expression. The only question is how it will change."'
"It'sddja vu all over again"2
In the early years of the Republic, Thomas Jefferson and
Alexander Hamilton did battle over the nation's future. Hamilton envisioned an activist government with an economic mandate to support investment and growth; he wanted the federal
government to "deliberately and systematically promote the industrialization of the United States."3 Hamilton advocated protection for industry and a strong financial system. 4 Jefferson's
views were to the contrary. He was suspicious of business and
feared large enterprises. To Jefferson, Hamilton's plans were a
t Sho Sato Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of
California, Berkeley. Those who are familiar with the literature will recognize
the influence of some of my former and current colleagues on this Article,
though they should not be held responsible for my conclusions. I would like to
thank Michael Bhargava for his research assistance, and Gil Grantmore,
David McGowan, Pam Samuelson, and symposium participants for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of
Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 58
(2004).
2. YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK 30 (1998).
3. PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 179 (1997).
4. See, e.g., RICHARD BROOKHISER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AMERICAN
89-97 (1999); LOUIS M. HACKER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON IN THE AMERICAN
TRADITION 166-67 (1957); ROBERT HENDRICKSON, HAMILTON I (1757-1789)
229-31, 342-44 (1976); see also David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History:
Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, and the Supreme Court, 85 MINN. L. REV.
755, 782-819 (2001).
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recipe for disaster. It seemed the "road to moral ruin" for the
government "[d]eliberately to create a huge manufacturing 'interest,' with thousands of money-grubbing manufacturers and
5
merchants, clamoring for special privileges and tariffs." Hence,
Jefferson advocated limited government and foresaw a nation
6
to
of small farmers and artisans. All of this is familiar fare
7
school.
high
from
history
American
anyone who remembers
Today's public debate over intellectual property (IP) rights
often looks like a replay of this battle-but one that is being
fought over software and the Internet rather than factories and
banks. To paint with a very broad brush, we can see a similar
division among the most visible participants in current disputes. On one side are the neo-Jeffersonians. They look to a decentralized future-in which the Internet and other digital
technologies will place public discourse and economic innovation in the people's hands. More specifically, the people take the
form of Linux users, Internet start-ups, computer hackers, public librarians, music-file swappers, and public school teachers
who seek the fair use of copyrighted materials-the modernday equivalent of Jefferson's yeoman farmers. Besides echoing
Jefferson, these authors' views also resonate with those of later
figures such as Louis Brandeis. What the Jeffersonians fear
most is that the government will allow corporate leviathans to
colonize the digital world, commodifying and then monopolizing
control over information and innovation. Jedi-like, the Jeffersonians battle against the dark forces of the evil Emperor and
Darth Vader.8 Leading legal scholars, particularly those whose
focus is on broad public policy or constitutional questions

5. JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 179.
6. As Richard Hofstadter observed:
By and large.., when Jefferson spoke warmly of the merits and
abilities of "the people" he meant "the farmers." He did not see a town
until he was almost eighteen, and he believed deeply that rural living
and rural people are the wellspring of civic virtue and individual vitality, that farmers are the best social base of a democratic republic.
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 27 (1948). In Jefferson's vision of the future, America "would be a nation of farmers, tilling
their own soil, independent, informed, unexcitable, and incorruptible." Id. at

30.
7. For a quick refresher, see Daniel A. Farber, The Story of McCulloch:
Banking on National Power, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 679, 682-90 (2004).
8. For discussion of the Jeffersonians, see Part I infra. It should be noted
that the JeffersonianlHamiltonian split mirrored an even earlier split between
"Court" and "Country" thinkers in England. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 13-29 (1993).
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rather than on more technical IP issues, advance this perspective.
On the other side of the current debate are the neoHamiltonians. They are less of a presence in the academic
world but are powerful in the courts and legislatures. 9 Unlike
the Jeffersonians, the neo-Hamiltonians view IP rights as generating a supply of investment funds for innovation. They are
confident that economies of scale and large enterprises are the
wave of the future, and they are unfazed by the prospect of economic dominance by massive enterprises. The neo-Hamiltonian
worldview finds support among corporate heavyweights in the
music and movie industries, some Federalist Society judges, giant Internet Service Providers (ISPs), established publishers,
and often a majority of members of Congress. Just as Hamilton
wanted government support for industry, the neo-Hamiltonians
want protection from the government for IP rights so that the
powerful acquisitive instinct can be harnessed to drive economic progress. Those whom the Jeffersonians consider brave
rebels, the Hamiltonians view as pirates; what the Jeffersonians consider rampant corruption, the Hamiltonians consider
the legitimate voice of important institutions in the political
process. 10 And like the original Hamiltonians and Jeffersonians, today's reincarnations are deeply suspicious of each
other's motives. As Jane Ginsburg recounts, some have described current debaters over digital copying as "paranoid, each
suspecting the other of bottomless malevolence.""
As we will see, one of the most remarkable aspects of this
debate over IP is that both sides portray themselves as defending the status quo ante-the IP regime as it existed before it
was disturbed. 12 For many, the status quo benchmark is defined as the situation before the digital age. In the case of some
Jeffersonians, however, the true status quo baseline was in
place before the twentieth-century media got their greedy
hands on copyright law. Each side, then, is protecting some
prior state of events from attack. Whether we are reading their
views in legal scholarship or in legislative history, it is clear
9. For discussion of the neo-Hamiltonians, see Part II infra.
10. If we wanted to complete the analogy to science fiction films, we could
say that the Hamiltonians view hackers as being much like the invasive species in Alien.
11. Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 61, 65 (2002).
12. This aspect of the debate is covered in Part III infra.
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that both sides feel imperiled. They agree that the barbarians
are at the gates, the city is under siege, and the situation is
grave.
But what barbarians, and on which side of the gates? The
Jeffersonians characterize the status quo in terms of the public
domain and fair use rights, both of which they seek to defend
against the incursion of stronger IP rights. 13 Thus, for Jeffersonians, the crucial aspect of the status quo is users' ability to
make free use of materials. The barbarians are the greedy
holders of IP rights, seeking to crush the public domain.
For Hamiltonians, on the other hand, the crucial aspect of
the status quo is not legal but economic. 14 They say the law
could recognize fairly broad user rights in a predigital age because those rights did not undermine the ability of producers to
obtain a fair return-in part because of the severe technological
limits on copying. Copying is now a greater threat requiring
more stringent remedies. Digital media make it possible to
make a virtually infinite number of exact copies at little or no
cost, an impossible feat in the predigital era. At the same time,
the digital world also makes it possible for rights holders to use
technological measures like encryption to control use without
recourse to the copyright law, obviating some of the relevance
of legal use rights. Thus, the Hamiltonians maintain, continuing the status quo of reasonable return to rights holders (and
ultimately to the creators of IP) requires a different set of use
rights today. For the Hamiltonians, it is the hackers and Internet copiers who are the barbarians, attacking the citadel of
progress that is the IP system. What the Jeffersonians see as
an aggressive invasion of public rights, the Hamiltonians view
as a simple effort to protect themselves against a new threat.
What makes these various efforts to define and defend the
status quo all the more remarkable is that both sides insist on
the unprecedented newness of the digital world. In reality,
there is no status quo, no preexisting regime that could potentially govern the digital domain. We have never before faced a
situation in which information has so much economic value yet
at the same time can be copied, modified, and transmitted
without cost. It is pointless to ask what kinds of use rights people had in digital products before the relevant technology existed to create those products and use them. Nor is there an an13. See infra Part I.A.
14.

See infra Part II.A.
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swer to the question of what the creators of those digital works
were entitled to expect in the way of a fair return before the
works themselves were technologically possible. In this instance, the status quo baseline is constructed rather than being
a simple matter of observation.
A new technology always presents the question of whether
an existing legal regime should apply. This issue is especially
acute here because the existing regime cannot even potentially
be extended as a whole. Practices that happily coexisted in
other settings are now in conflict, so we must choose which aspects of the prior regime to extend and which to abandon. In
short, before we can speak about extending the copyright status
quo to digital media, we must reconstruct that status quo. If
"the significance of legal values is in fact always inseparably
connected to the social practices that are the precondition for
their actual realization," 15 and if those social practices are in
flux, judges must somehow conceptualize the social practices
before they can begin to decide First Amendment issues. When
we define a baseline in this context, we claim to be describing
the past, but we are really imagining the future.
This Article will explore different understandings of the IP
status quo and how those views of the copyright baseline are
embedded in broader economic, social, and constitutional commitments-in particular, in the worldviews that this Article
links with Jefferson and Hamilton. In particular, we will see
how different approaches to First Amendment issues flow from
these different understandings of the baseline. 16 The two perspectives offer very different ways of conceptualizing how IP relates to the digital world. From the Jeffersonian perspective,
traditional use rights are critical to reconciling copyright and
the First Amendment. These use rights have economic value,
but they also have intrinsic value because of their connections
with individual autonomy and initiative. From the Hamiltonian
15. Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1249, 1280 (1995).
16. There is considerable academic literature about the relationship between the First Amendment and copyright, tracing back to B. Melville Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the FirstAmendment Guarantees of Free Speech
and the Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970), and Paul Goldstein, Copyright
and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970). For the present, at
least, some of the fundamental questions seem to have been settled by the Supreme Court. Some significant First Amendment questions remain, however,
and on these the modern-day Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians sharply disagree.
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perspective, however, free speech is by definition furthered
whenever Congress is providing rewards for creators of IP and
17
thereby "promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts."'

User rights are secondary to property rights, and essentially
consist of whatever Congress chooses to leave outside of the
control of the IP owner. Each view entails a different baseline.' 8
The clash between these worldviews reached the Supreme
Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft.' 9 The outcome in Eldred was a victory for the Hamiltonians, as loudly lamented by the Jeffersonian camp. But the Eldred opinion held out hope for the Jeffersonians. The Court accepted the Jeffersonian view of the
baseline as constituted by the legal distribution of use rights
rather than their practical utilization and economic effects on
IP owners. 20 In doing so, the Court left open the door to constitutional challenges to changes in the legal status quo. 21 In
short, the Court did not accept the Hamiltonian position of
First Amendment validity for any measure that increases returns to the creators of works. Instead, the Court accepted the
Jeffersonian view that incursions on traditional use rights are
constitutionally questionable.
Perhaps equally importantly, Eldred should be a reminder
to lower courts that traditional use rights have a constitutional
dimension and should be construed with more than investor return in mind. While the Court's opinion was far from the kind
of frontal attack on monopolistic rights that the Jeffersonians
would have liked, it quietly endorsed a key part of their intellectual framework. Adoption of the Jeffersonian baseline may
put at risk legislation such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),22 a Hamiltonian favorite.

17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18. For a general discussion of baselines and their significance (particularly that of the status quo baseline), see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION 3-7, 45-62, 347-53 (1993).
19. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).

20. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the Eldred litigation).
21. Compare Frederick Schauer's observation that Eldred "can be considered not a defeat, but rather one further step toward the entry of copyright
into the domain of the First Amendment," simply because the Court acknowledged that the First Amendment does bear on copyright issues. Frederick
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A PreliminaryExploration
of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1799 (2004).
22. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-505).
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This is not the place for a systematic investigation of the
relationship between free speech and IP. But the Court was
clearly correct in its perception that the Constitution values
both the "Progress of Science and useful Arts" 23 and the intrinsic value of free expression. The task after Eldred will be reconciling the two in statutory interpretation and (less often) in
constitutional adjudication.
This Article will investigate the contest over baselines that
define conflicts between free speech and IP. Parts I-III will illuminate the ways in which the current debate on these issues
is polarized. The Article will begin with the Jeffersonians, who
are the most vocal force in the legal academy, and then examine the Hamiltonians, whose influence is greater in courts and
legislatures. Part IV will then consider the mix of Jeffersonian
and Hamiltonian elements in the Supreme Court's major ruling
on copyright and free speech, with some thoughts about the
implications of the Court's decision for restrictions on digital
technologies. In the long run, the fact that the Hamiltonians
won in Eldred may be less important than the fact that the
Court's opinion adopted a Jeffersonian baseline.
First, a caveat is in order: trying to make sense of intellectual disputes by constructing ideal types of the opposing parties
is an old venture. This can be an illuminating exercise, but the
risk is always that the nuances of individual positions will be
lost along the way-what is intended to be an ideal type instead becomes a caricature. In particular, moderates are likely
to feel that they have been unfairly lumped with more extreme
views. This Article takes a gamble that the potential illumination is worth the risks, but one should not be deceived into a
reductionist view of the debate. By comparing today's debate
with an older, more famous one, I do not mean to imply that
the participants are merely reciting tired old lines, nor do I
mean to deny the diversity that exists within the current debate. Rather, I mean to show how, just as in the case of Hamilton and Jefferson, current constitutional perspectives are integrated with sophisticated social and economic visions. What
animates the current public debate over IP and the Constitution are not merely different economic models or doctrinal interpretations, but different visions of the future. 24
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24. Another preliminary comment is also in order. I will speak generally
of disputes over "intellectual property," even though most of the discussion
will be focused on copyright and related issues, rather than patent or trade-
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I. THE JEFFERSONIAN BASELINE: THE LEGAL
STATUS QUO
The Jeffersonian perspective has fared well within the
academy. It seems to be shared to varying degrees by most of
the leading academic writers about IP. As one critic remarks:
[Amn entire vocabulary has been built to support this line of argument.
Control-talk [i.e., Jeffersonianism] is of "the second enclosure movement," the lurking "tragedy of the anticommons," or the dangers of
"patent thickets"-not to mention the phenomenon of litigation efforts
(or perhaps social movements?). Sporting their own slogans (and logos), such as 'Tree25the Mouse," "Create Like It's 1790," or "When
Copyright Attacks."

Clearly, what is happening here is more than a dispute over legal doctrine. This is a culture war of sorts, although it has not
captured the public's attention so far.
I will begin by sketching this perspective on IP and examining how Jeffersonians define the baseline. Then I will show
how understandings of IP issues fit into a broader worldview,
one that would be familiar in its broad outlines to Thomas Jefferson himself.
A. DEFENDING THE INTELLECTUAL COMMONS

A good place to start in understanding the Jeffersonian
perspective is an essay by Lawrence Lessig, in which he not
only provides a vivid portrayal of the Jeffersonian vision but
also meditates on what it means to maintain a baseline under
changed circumstances. 26 Lessig begins the essay by asking
what it means to follow the eighteenth-century federalists today. Does it mean following their call for more centralized government? If so, he wonders, how can the Federalist Society be
dedicated to states' rights? But being faithful to federalism may
not be a matter of replicating the Founders' positions. The federalism of today, Lessig says, may not favor centralization: "If
it is a balance of power between federal and state authority
that is right, then Federalists might well need to push in dif-

mark. Despite the significant differences between these areas of IP law, the
debates tend to be polarized along similar lines.
25. R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants To Be Free: Intellectual Property
and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 996-97 (2003) (footnotes omitted). "Free the Mouse" is a reference to the Copyright Term Extension Act's extension of the copyright on Mickey Mouse. See id. at 997 n.7.
26. See Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV.
1057 (2001).
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ferent directions as the balance changes." 2 7 Lessig then turns to
the topic of copyright and the First Amendment, where he
makes a similar argument about the need to restore a historical
28
balance.
According to Lessig, the balance in copyright has changed
dramatically since the framing. The first copyright statute provided a relatively short, fourteen-year term of protection for
maps, charts, and books. In the first decade of the statute less
than five percent of published works were registered (not
counting foreign works, which were not protected at all).29
Copyright did not protect derivative works-you could translate or adapt or abridge or set to music copyrighted works,
without the permission of the author.30 In short, "[t]he message
of the statute was simply this: Pirate presses, focus your energy
on stealing from the British and French; leave Americans
alone."31 But that modest original vision of copyright has been

swept away.
Lessig explains how today's system has changed:
Copyright no longer is limited to maps, charts and books. It now
touches practically any creative work reduced to a tangible form. It
protects music and performances and architecture and certain design.
It protects machines written in words-we call that software-and
words written on machines-we call that the Internet.
And it protects those creative acts no longer for an initial term of
fourteen years. It protects these creative works for the life of the author plus seventy years-which means, for example, in the case of an
author such as Irving Berlin, a term that exceeds 140 years. It protects this work not contingently-not, that is, upon registration. It
protects it, and all creative work, automatically-for a term that does
not have to be renewed, for a life that exceeds the author's.
And it protects not just against pirate publishers. The scope of
copyright now protects an extraordinarily broad derivative right. The
right to translate some works, the right to perform, the right to adapt
a play, or to make a movie-all these are rights that are now included
within the originally sparse "exclusive right" that the Copyright
Clause granted.3 2

27. Id. at 1057.
28. See id. at 1061.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1061-62. A somewhat different vision of the history is presented
in Thomas Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 272, 329-49 (2004).
31. Lessig, supra note 26, at 1062.
32. Id. at 1062-63. Particularly apt is Lessig's reference to software as
"machines written in words," which seems to capture the somewhat ambiguous status of code as (partly) speech and (mostly) function.
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In summary, the "tiny regulation of a tiny proportion of the extraordinary range of creative work in 1790 has morphed into
has any connection to
this massive regulation of everyone who
33
authorship."
creative
of
trivial
most
the
The Framers' vision, Lessig tells us, "was balance ....
34
Limited protections, a vibrant public domain." But we now
face a time of peril. That vision is threatened, ironically, just at
the moment when the triumph of the Framers' vision seemed
35
within reach because of the possibilities of the Internet. For

"[j]ust as the moment when the creative potential of artists and
the reinnovators is greatest, the technologies that 3control
6
peak."
their
at
also
are
creativity
sources of that
The risk then is a radical shift in IP away from the balance
seen not only by the Framers but also by such twentieth37
century copyright experts as Melville Nimmer. The burden of

proof, Lessig maintains, lies on those who would defend this
sharp change in the status quo:
The first vision [one of IP hegemony] may well prevail. But it is our
job as lawyers to make certain that we all understand the change this
vision represents. Not just the change from the view of men who wore
wigs two hundred years ago; but a change from the view of a man
whose sense of balance and respect for the values of copyright defined
the field just a generation ago.

33. Id. at 1063. It is easy to see the link with Lessig's earlier discussion of
centralization. The Framers enacted the Commerce Clause, among other parts
of the Constitution, to create more central authority, but their expectations
about the use of the commerce power were far more modest than today's administrative state. To maintain the balance they originally had in mind between state and nation, according to Lessig, we must provide more constitutional protection for states as a counterweight to this increased national
power.
34. Id. at 1072. Indeed, America's early IP policy has been described as
the encouragement of piracy, particularly through obtaining trade secrets of
European and British employers by encouraging immigration of their employees to America. See DORON S. BAN-ATAR, TRADE SECRETS: INTELLECTUAL
PIRACY AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL POWER 78-93 (2004). This
fits with the fact noted by Lessig that the copyright law did not protect foreign
works, which could be pirated at will by American presses.
35. Lessig, supranote 26, at 1072.
36.

Id.

37. Id. at 1070. The specific reference to Nimmer was partly due to his
sheer eminence as a copyright scholar, but probably was also a gracious acknowledgment that Lessig was delivering a lecture in a series named for
Nimmer.
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If there are no limits [on IP rights], then those who would defend
the change; they need to show us, as a culture and as a tradition why
this new vision of state protection [for IP] is better than the old. 38

A similar alarm is sounded by Yochai Benkler, who argues
that we are in the midst of an effort to enclose the "public domain" of free speech by privatizing it in the hands of large corporations. 39 According to Benkler and Lessig, the status quo
(not just the balance of the Framers but the balance of IP rights
and user rights of "just a generation ago") is under siege. 40 It is
up to us to defend it.
One particular source of alarm is the DMCA. 4 1 The DMCA
prohibits the use of certain technologies to evade digital protection measures, as well as the production of or traffic in those
technologies. 42 This would not be particularly troublesome if
the ban were limited to infringing uses. However, the statute is
not limited to the use of circumvention technologies for infringement purposes, and also seemingly prohibits utilizing
these technologies to make fair use of material or to access ma43
terial in the public domain.
38. Lessig, supra note 26, at 1072.
39. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 359
(1999). No doubt if the DMCA had been passed a few years later it would have
been called the PDCA-short for Patriot Digital Copyright Act!
40. Lessig, supra note 26, at 1072; see Benkler, supra note 39, at 354-58.
41. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-505); see Pamela Samuelson, DRM (And, Or, Vs.) the Law, 46
COMM. ACM 41, 42 (2003) ('The DMCA impedes the progress of science, is
economically unjustifiable, and lacks the balance the Constitution requires of
intellectual property legislation.").
42. A good description of the statute, along with an enlightening discussion of the history of IP law, can be found in Robert Merges, One Hundred
Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV.
2187 (2000). For a more detailed discussion of how the statute applies to efforts to make fair use of materials, see David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in
the Digital Millennium CopyrightAct, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 702-34 (2000).
One of the DMCA's exceptions is for encryption research, but the exception
may arguably warp the future progress of the field. See Joseph P. Liu, The

DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 501

(2003); see also Cassandra Imfeld, Playing Fair with Fair Use?, The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act's Impact on Encryption Researchers and Academicians, 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 111 (2003).
43. Merges, supra note 42, at 2202-03. Fair use is a defense to infringement. The leading Supreme Court case on fair use is Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,471 U.S. 539 (1985). For an argument that the
DMCA could be construed to allow such a defense, see Jane C. Ginsburg,
Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 8-9
(2000).
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Thus, the DMCA may in effect allow the practical equivalent of copyright protection-sometimes called "paracopyright"4<--prohibiting fair use or even any use of noncopyrightable material. As Benkler explains:
The fundamental objection is that the anticircumvention provision
would prohibit anyone from using materials protected by technological measures without permission, even for a privileged purpose. For
example, a literary critic blacklisted by a publisher would be subject
to the criminal provision if he uses circumvention software to read
and review (with limited quotations) that publisher's new book. If the
critic is paid for the review by a newspaper, he may have five years in
prison to dull his critical faculties, so that when he is again free he
$500,000 necessary to pay his fine without offending
can earn the
45
publishers.

Even quite sober-minded IP traditionalists are concerned about
the shift in power represented by such legislation, and fear that
from a baseline of competition to
we are in the middle of a shift
46
property."
much
"too
one of
Indeed, there has been a flowering of new IP claims, although the courts do not always uphold them. Some examples
given by Mark Lemley include the National Basketball Association's claim of copyright in the scores of games, a building
owner's claim that a postmark of the skyline violates its trademark, and the right of a celebrity to "prevent anyone (or anything) from looking or sounding too much like them" (in the
case of one celebrity, the anything being a robot in a blonde
wig). 47 These examples all express the "view that information is
property and someone should own it."48 Conventional IP rights
have also been increasingly broadly construed: "Trademark
44. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and the First Amendment: What
Eldred Misses and Portends, in COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH: COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen eds.,
forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 26), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
614642.
45. Benkler, supra note 39, at 419 (citation omitted). As Benkler explains,
the statute does contain a safeguard in the form of potential rule-making relief
from the Librarian of Congress, but he sees this as an ineffective mechanism,
and as being a further restriction on fair use in disguise. Id. at 416, 419-20,
428.

46. Merges, supra note 42, at 2239-40. The kind of monitoring of users
made possible by DMCA-protected technologies may also represent a threat to
privacy. See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at
"CopyrightManagement" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 990-93 (1996)
(discussing earlier proposals similar to the DMCA).
47. Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property,
75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 898-99 (1997) (book review).
48. Id. at 900.
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owners can prevent uses of their marks as obvious parodies or
for entirely noncommercial purposes, and are well on their way

to owning the exclusive right to pun."49 And if the existing stat-

utes fail to provide enough protection, the owner can use a
shrink-wrap license-a classic contract of adhesion-"to disregard the limits imposed by the law, in effect rewriting the law
by private contract to suit his needs." 50 With new technology,
digital rights management may even make it possible to create
self-enforcing restrictions, so that digital works simply cannot
be copied or used even for purposes that are permitted by the
copyright laws. 51 Compared with the classic contract of adhesion, this provides the "adhesion" without the bother of the
"contract." It poses "a challenge to the very idea of the public
domain as an intrinsic part of intellectual property law." 52

The concerns discussed in this section are not limited to IP
specialists. For example, a leading free speech theorist has remarked on the "continual historical process of a copyright extension to encompass an increasing enclosure of the public domain of expressive content." 53 Another constitutional scholar
with a special interest in cyberlaw proclaimed that the digital
revolution "presents new dangers for freedom of speech, dangers that will be realized unless we accommodate ourselves
properly to the changes the digital age brings in its wake." 54 In

short, a close examination of what is happening at the intersection of IP law and free expression has left many observers with
a sense of alarm.

49. Id.
50. Id. at 901.
51. As Jack Balkin explains:
Digital rights management schemes, for example, can make digital
content unreadable after a certain number of uses; they can control
the geographical places where content can be viewed; they can require
that content be viewed in a particular order; they can keep viewers
from skipping through commercials; and so on.
Balkin, supra note 1, at 18. The likely effectiveness of this technology is a matter of debate. See Wagner, supra note 25, at 1015-16 (questioning its efficiency
and effectiveness).
52. Lemley, supra note 47, at 902.
53. C. Edwin Baker, FirstAmendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 891, 949 (2002).
54. Balkin, supra note 1, at 3; see also Netanel, supra note 44, at 20 (criticizing "[tioday's bloated copyright").
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B. THE BRANDEISIAN VISION
In the essay discussed earlier, Lessig does not merely
worry about changes in IP rights but about the changes in eco55
nomic and social power that might go with them. He portrays
a conflict between two visions-visions I have called Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian:
As this struggle plays out, there are two visions of the future. One in
which the most significant aspects of our culture remain perpetually
in the control of a relatively small number of corporations-the publishers of our day. And the other, where these elements of our culture,
after "a short period" fall outside of exclusive control, free for anyone
to take and use as they see fit.56

Thus, his worry is not just that individual rights will be impaired but that the power of wealthy institutions will become
yet more bloated. Similarly, Jack Balkin sees behind certain leand progal positions "a more basic agenda" of "the promotion
57
tection of the property rights of media corporations."
This fear of the power of the economic elite and of the corporations that they control goes back to the early years of the
Republic. It was at the heart of the battle between Jefferson
58
and Hamilton over the Bank of the United States. Jefferson
and his allies, such as James Madison, saw in Hamilton's efforts the influence of "forces of speculation and commerce" that
59
was only one part of a "web of subservience." Indeed, though
it is less germane for our purposes than his general worldview,
Jefferson was no great enthusiast for IP rights, which he feared
as a form of monopoly. Though he recognized that limited mo"too
nopolies might act as inducements, he found the benefit
60
doubtful to be opposed to their general suppression."

55. See Lessig, supra note 26 and accompanying text.
56. Id. at 1072.
57. Balkin, supra note 1, at 24; see also Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright
Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134, 135 (attributing Clinton administration support for the proposal that became the DMCA to "campaign contributions" from
"the copyright industry, especially members of the Hollywood community, who
are vital to the president's reelection bid").
58. See ELKINS & McKITRICK, supra note 8, at 224.
59. Id.; see also JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 242 (noting the "shudders of
loathing" by Jefferson and Madison when they saw the bank in operation).
60. See Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and
Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Propertyas Constitutional
Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2377 (2003). Madison helped draft the IP clause
of the Constitution, but appears to have thought that Congress had no power
to protect IP beyond the limits of that clause. Id. at 2381-82.
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In the twentieth century, the best-known proponent of the
Jeffersonian side of this debate was Justice Brandeis. Much of
his career was a battle against corporate power on behalf of individuals and small businesses. 6 1 Not surprisingly, he also
championed the individual against state power in the context of
the First Amendment, most famously in his Whitney concurrence.6 2 Also not surprisingly, he was unenthusiastic about the
creation of new IP rights. 6 3 There is much of this preference for
the 'little guy" in the writings of the modern Jeffersonians (or
perhaps one should say cyber-Jeffersonians).64
On occasion, this perspective is explicitly linked with
Brandeis. Yochai Benkler recalls Brandeis's statement that
"once information is communicated to others it becomes 'free
as
the air to common use,"' 65 and he calls for a return to "Justice
Brandeis's conceptual baseline."6 6 Benkler fears that concentrated control of information resources is likely to "exclude
challenges to prevailing wisdom" and to "translate unequal distribution of economic power in society into unequal distribution
of power to express ideas and engage in public discourse" 67both very Brandeisian concerns. Specifically, Benkler warns
that what he calls enclosure of the public domain "is likely to
lead, over time, to concentration of a greater portion of the information production function in society in the hands of large
commercial organizations that vertically integrate new production with owner-information inventory management."68 Enclosure "therefore conflicts with the First Amendment injunction
that government not prevent people from using information or
communicating it," and violates the "First Amendment com61. See generally BRANDEIS AND AMERICA (Nelson L. Dawson ed., 1989);
BRANDEIS ON DEMOCRACY (Philippa Strum ed., 1995); MELVIN I. UROFSKY, A
MIND OF ONE PIECE: BRANDEIS AND AMERICAN REFORM (1971).
62. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371-80 (1927).
63. See Intl News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 267 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court erred in recognizing a form
of property interest in the news).
64. This vision of the "little guy" versus the corporations is clearly an
oversimplification. Important corporate interests can be found on both sides of
the debate, with the digital technology industry often aligned against content
providers. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need To Be Revised, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 533 (1999).
65. Benkler, supra note 39, at 355.
66. Id. at 357.
67. Id. at 377-78.
68. Id. at 410.
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mitment to attain a diverse, decentralized 'marketplace of
69
ideas."'
Besides providing a striking metaphor for the reduction of
user rights, the reference to enclosure also reinforces the theme
of social exploitation by the rich and powerful. The metaphor of
enclosure is historically freighted. It harkens back to the "enclosure" movement in English history when great lords drove
small farmers off their lands and burned their houses to use
the land for grazing sheep. 70 These historical resonances are
not lost on the Jeffersonians. Indeed, one can even find Jeffersonian praise for the "cyber-yeoman," the independent Web
publisher taking "power from large institutions such as government, corporations and the media," who in turn are trying
to enclose the public informational domain and force out the
independents. 7 1 Here, the threat is as much technological as legal. Reinforced by the DMCA, the use of "trusted system" technology may "afford complete control over access to a work,"
leaving "the Net's version of the English yeomanry" with "no
means of resisting the theft of their monopoly-restraining
rights, nor of preserving their valuable transformative
works." 72 This rhetoric may not do justice to the economic com-

plexities or the political nuances, which can align powerful Silicon Valley firms on the side of the yeoman. But oversimplified
as it may be, the rhetoric is nonetheless powerful.

69. Id. at 358.
70. See Hannibal Travis, Piratesof the Information Infrastructure:Blackstonian Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 777,
787-88 (2000). One well-known IP scholar quotes poetry lambasting the enclosure movement:

The law locks up the man or woman
Who steals the goose from off the common
But leaves the greater villain loose
Who steals the common from off the goose.
James Boyle, Fencing Off Ideas: Enclosure & the Disappearanceof the Public
Domain,DAEDALUS, Spring 2000, at 13, 13.
71. See Travis, supra note 70, at 854 (quoting ANDREW SHAPIRO, THE
CONTROL REVOLUTION:

How THE INTERNET IS PUTTING INDIDUALS IN

CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW, at xiii (1999)). Some commen-

tators criticize the public domain from the opposite side of the Hamiltonians,
arguing that failure to award property rights privileges dominant groups in
Western societies over indigenous peoples and other groups whose traditional
knowledge can be taken free of charge by large corporations. See Anupam
Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 1331, 1334-35 (2004).

72.

See Travis, supra note 70, at 861.
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Other scholars warn of the danger to the human spirit
posed by enclosure. Jed Rubenfeld laments the expansion of the
concept of infringement: "Today, reproducing a minute or two
from a film (in a television broadcast) or a few hundred words
from a book (in a news article) is unquestionably enough to
constitute infringement." 73 This broad understanding of reproduction, along with an expansive definition of derivative work
(a new work created with the use of copyrighted elements of an
older work) casts a pall over the ability to transform existing
works through creative imagination. Rubenfeld denounces this
development in ringing terms:
Unlike literal copying, derivative works always involve a fresh exercise of imagination .... The claim is that allowing others freely to
imagine their own visualizations or continuations of an author's story,
and to communicate these imaginings to others, will produce legally
cognizable harms. But under the First Amendment, there can be no
such thing as a harmful exercise of the imagination.7 4

Discontent with seizing the intellectual public domain, the IP
owners seek to strip us of the power of imagination and crush
the spirit of individualism. Recall Jefferson's proclamation, now
inscribed on his monument, that he opposed every form of tyranny over the human mind. 75 His spirit is alive and well today.
Another Jeffersonian theme is the fear of corruption by
moneyed interests. This theme, too, has resurfaced, in the form
of warnings of "The First Deadly Sin: 'Pigging Out' at the IP
Trough." 76 Stories are legion of unsavory, though not necessarily illegal, influence over the legislative process-an influence
stemming from the distribution of perks and campaign contributions to legislators. The result is legislation that is more the
product of industry desires than of legislative deliberation. 77
Indeed, it is said that we have "reached a point where legisla73. Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination:Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 52 (2002).
74. Id. at 54.
75. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Benjamin Rush (Sept. 23, 1800),
in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 558 (Adrienne

Koch & William Peden eds., 1944) ("I have sworn upon the altar of God, eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man.").
76. See Merges, supra note 42, at 2233-40.
77. It is unclear whether this is a new development. Glynn Lunney speaks
of the "constant clamoring of copyright's properties class," Glynn S. Lunney,
Jr., The Death of Copyright:Digital Technology, PrivateCopying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 818 (2001), and says that
"[p]olitical pressure, not technology, has driven copyright's expansion" over the
past two centuries. See id. at 895.
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tive history must be ignored because not even the hands of con78
gressional staff have touched committee reports." Similarly,
Jessica Litman argues that much modern copyright legislation
of
is "overwhelmingly likely to appropriate value for the benefit
79
major stakeholders at the expense of the public at large."

Stu-

dents of eighteenth-century history will instantly recognize the
familiar complaints of civic republicans concerning the danger
that Jefferson keenly voiced in his
of corruption, a complaint
80
Hamilton.
with
disputes
This historical similarity tells us something about the
structure of neo-Jeffersonian thought. It does not purport to tell
us whether their view of contemporary society is valid. Even if
we consider the original Jeffersonians' views to be a quaint
aversion to the coming Industrial Revolution, that does not
mean we can ignore the warnings of their modern counterparts.
Concerns that may have been misplaced or overblown at the
turn of the nineteenth century might be more solidly grounded
at the turn of the twenty-first.
II. THE HAMILTONIAN BASELINE: THE ECONOMIC
STATUS QUO
Today's Hamiltonians offer a much different perspective on
IP and free speech issues. Rather than fearing IP rights, they
view them as the engines of creativity and progress. What they
fear is not the overextension of IP rights but rather that the
economic value of those rights might be so degraded by new
copying techniques that those rights can no longer perform
their vital function of rewarding creators of new works. Their
78. See Merges, supra note 42, at 2235 (quoting William F. Paltry, Copyright and the Legislative Process:A PersonalPerspective, 14 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 139, 141 (1996)). Merges himself provides some significant qualifications regarding countervailing forces, but the general concern he voices is
widely shared, often more vehemently.
79. JEsSIcA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 144-45 (2001). Litman's characterization of the resulting legislation as rent seeking may be open to dispute,
but her historical account does clearly establish that Congress has relied on
relatively formalized bargaining between interest groups in crafting copyright
legislation.
80. See, e.g., JAMES H. READ, POWER VERSUS LIBERTY: MADISON,
HAMILTON, WILSON, AND JEFFERSON 140 (2000) (citing Jefferson's belief that

Hamilton's "commercial and manufacturing policies would have the effect of
enriching the favored few at the expense of the independent farmer, the necessary social base of a republican political order"); see also CLAUDE G. BOWERS,
JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON 168-72 (1925) (describing attacks appearing in

various papers and journals).
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baseline is not some preexisting set of user rights, but rather
the incentive structure created by IP laws. They seek to shore
up existing IP rights and, if possible, to extend them. They see
no threat to free expression from this direction. Rather than
viewing corporations and other large institutions as oppressive,
the Hamiltonians view them as critical sources of resources for
innovation, creativity, and dissemination. We explore their
views in this part.
A. DEFENDING PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FAIR RETURNS

To the extent that the status quo is conceptualized in
terms of fair returns to rights holders, technological changes
determine user rights. From the Hamiltonian perspective, user
rights are simply what are left over after IP rights are expanded to their natural limit, which is, in turn, set by the diminishing returns of increased protection to rights holders.
Where this natural limit is found depends on how user rights
impact the returns to IP holders. In the past, of course,
recognizing a First Amendment freedom to engage in noncommercial
copying, performance, or distribution would have left by far the largest portion of the economic value of the 'authored' content in the
hands of the copyright holder, thus adequately serving the primary
function of copyright recognition-to provide incentives for creation
and distribution of quality communications. 8 1

Thus, IP law could tolerate the possibility of First Amendment exemptions in the past. However, the situation is different today. For, as Mark Lemley (not himself a Hamiltonian)
points out:
It costs essentially nothing to make and distribute a copy of a document on the Internet today; it costs a lot more to convey the same information by typesetting, printing, and binding a book, and then delivering it to a warehouse, which will deliver the book to a store,
which will sell the book to a customer.... Counterfeiting offers some
return if the "intellectual value" component of a book is twenty percent of the purchase price; it is much more lucrative if the intellectual
value is ninety-five percent of the price. Hence, the "public goods"
problem in economics is exacerbated as information itself increasingly
becomes what is being sold. 82

It is because of these technological changes that IP holders
feel threatened. Hilary Rosen, president of the Recording Industry Association of America, urged Congress to pass the
81.

Baker, supra note 53, at 903-04 (quoting L. RAY PATTERSON &

STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 195-96 (1991)).

82.

Lemley, supra note 47, at 876.
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DMCA in 1998, arguing: "[O]ur members share a common
thread-a fragile existence wholly dependent upon the protection of their IP. This fine filament upon which so much American creativity, ingenuity and commerce rests is under constant
strain, and you have before you an unparalleled opportunity to
strengthen it."83 Jack Valenti vividly expressed this same sense
of threat when he appeared before Congress. To explain the
need for new legislation to prevent illegal file sharing, Valenti
analogized his position to that of a general under massive attack: "It is said [that during] World War I, [French General]
Foch... was in a furious battle with the Germans, and he
wired back to military headquarters, 'My left is falling back.
84
My right is collapsing. My center cannot hold. I shall attack."'
That, Valenti added, is "precisely the way I feel in confronting
the assault on American movies and these file-stealing
groups."8 5 Among the enemies that he mentioned were the
"critics whose hidden objective is to brutalize and shrink the
value of copyright if not totally banish it from the Constitution"86 (in other words, the academic Jeffersonians and their allies). Note that the baseline here, which Valenti portrays as be83. The WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act: Hearing on H.R.
2281 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms., Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the
House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 43-44 (1998) [hereinafter WIPO
Copyright Treaties Implementation Act Testimony] (statement of Hilary B.
Rosen, President and Chief Executive Officer, Recording Industry Association
of America). A similar view is expressed in a petition for certiorari on behalf of
the motion picture industry, seeking to overturn a lower court decision allowing a form of file sharing:
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit's decision threatens the very foundations of
our copyright system in the digital era. The ease with which copyrighted works in digital form can be unlawfully copied and distributed
millions of times over on the Internet makes it especially important
that traditional principles of secondary copyright liability apply to enterprises that, like respondents, brazenly encourage and profit from
infringement. Unless respondents and those like them can be held accountable, copyright will soon mean nothing on the Internet, and the
incentives on which our copyright system rests will be imperiled.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 044-80), cert. granted, 125 S.
Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (mem.).
84. Privacy and Piracy: The Paradox of Illegal File Sharing on Peer-ToPeer Networks and the Impact of Technology on the Entertainment Industry:
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on
Gov't Affairs, 108th Cong. 17 (2003) [hereinafter Digital Future of Movies]
(statement of Jack Valenti, President and Chief Executive Officer, Motion Picture Association of America).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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ing under attack by the Jeffersonians, is not a specific set of
copyright entitlements but rather the economic "value of copyright," which is strikingly portrayed as the innocent victimized
by brutality. As Hilary Rosen described, the portent of the
DMCA is its recognition that "content has value and it's worth
protecting. And, the technology and consumer electronics industries-and ultimately consumers-all benefit by working
with us to deliver secure content in the digital marketplace.
This mutuality of interests has flowed from the DMCA framework."

87

More measured expressions of concern about the threat of
copying can also be found. For example, the Register of Copyrights has recently spoken of the need to address "the most important issue facing our copyright system today: new services
that employ peer-to-peer technology to create vast, global networks of copyright infringement."8 8 Similarly, in a carefully
reasoned report, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) advocates strengthening the ability of rights holders to control use.
The CBO concluded that although the economic analysis is
complex, "the magnitude of illicit consumption of copyrighted
works in digital form today-music files shared over the Internet, for example, or movie and software illegally reproduced
and distributed on CD-ROM-suggests that potential efficiency
gains can be realized by applying advances in digital technology to legal markets for creative works."8 9
As one might expect, academics with Hamiltonian leanings
are more balanced in their views and their rhetoric is more re87. WIPO One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital Entertainment on the Internet and Other Media: Hearing on Serial No. 106-83 Before the Subcommittee on Telecomms., Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the House
Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 19 (1999) (prepared statement of Hilary
Rosen, President and Chief Executive Officer, Recording Industry Association
of America).
88. Protecting Innovation and Art While Preventing Piracy: Hearing on S.
2560 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement
of the Honorable Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services, United States Copyright Office), http://www.
copyright.gov/docs/regstat072204.html.
89.

CONGRESSIONAL

BUDGET OFFICE,

COPYRIGHT

ISSUES IN DIGITAL

MEDIA, at vii (2004). The report discusses a variety of factors, pro and con,
that might be implicated by the use of digital rights management and other
techniques to impose differential charges for different uses of materials. See
id. at ix-x; cf. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 219 (concluding that a "property regime more narrowly defined than under current copyright laws-more 'privatized'--would offer considerable savings in group negotiating and bargaining costs").
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strained than that of industry advocates like Valenti. Nevertheless, similar themes can be found in the work of academic advocates of strong copyright protection. For example, Jane Ginsburg explains that the prospect of "mass uncompensated
copying by the public" motivates "the feeling of desperation and
even moral outrage that one senses pervades many of the copyright owners' actions." 90 She warns of the risk that unrestrained Internet use may "undermine the ability of copyright
owners, and especially of individual creators, to make a living
from their creativity."9' Ginsburg reminds us that "traditional
copyright doctrine.., does not compel, and should not counsel,
92
socializing the fruits of new modes of copyright exploitation."
Congress seems to have shared such concerns. (That would
be no surprise to the Jeffersonians, who would attribute it to
illicit political influence by the media and entertainment industries.) As the Second Circuit said regarding the DMCA: "Fearful that the ease with which pirates could copy and distribute a
copyrightable work in digital form was overwhelming the capacity of conventional copyright enforcement to find and enjoin
unlawfully copied material, Congress sought to combat copyright piracy in its earlier stages, before the work was even copied."93 Thus, the DMCA is a monument to Hamiltonian fears

(and, unsurprisingly, therefore a prime Jeffersonian target).
The historical parallel with Hamilton is again striking. A
similar desire to use monopolies as incentives for economic progress was strong among Hamilton and his fellow members of
the Federalist Party:
The Federalists, in general, believed monopolies could advance the
commonweal. As their deep commitment to the federally incorporated
Bank of the United States demonstrates, Hamilton and other members of the Federalist Party did not share the deep fear of government-created monopolies that plagued the Republicans [like Jefferson]. Similarly, at the state level, the debate about the legitimacy and
the scope of state-granted monopolies in fields such as banking,
steamboat franchises, bridges, ferries, and canals was a debate between Federalists [like Hamilton], who typically believed monopolies
could be an engine of economic progress, and Republicans [led by Jef-

90. See Ginsburg, supra note 43, at 45.
91. See id. Ginsburg's emphasis on "individual creators" is a significant
and arguably non-Hamiltonian element in her approach.
92. See id. at 41.
93. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 435 (2d Cir.
2001).
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ferson], who typically viewed monopolies as vehicles for illegitimate
creation of privilege.-s

History, it seems, sometimes does repeat itself.
It is important to note that today's Hamiltonians, in their
efforts to maintain incentives for rights holders, do not view
themselves as upsetting the traditional balance of copyright
law. Jane Ginsburg criticizes some cases of overreaching by
rights holders, and observes approvingly that the courts applied the "fair use privilege" to limit such overreaching.9 5 (Note
the terminology, however: what the Jeffersonian's view as a
right she portrays as a privilege.) She views these cases as
proving "The System Still Works."96 She also sees "little concrete evidence" that the DMCA has diminished fair use. 97 Instead, she says, "whatever its many imperfections," the DMCA
"endeavors to foster a digital environment in which enhanced
security encourages the digital release of works, and limitation
98
on service provider liability promotes their broad circulation."
B. HAMILTONIANISM AND SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS
We have seen that today's Jeffersonians combine their
view of IP and speech issues with a broader economic and social
vision. The same is true of the neo-Hamiltonians. As with Hamilton, one of their primary appeals is to economic growth. Just
as Hamilton applauded the Bank of the United States, so the
head of the Motion Pictures Association touts his industry:
The Copyright Industries (movies, TV, home video, music, publishing
and computer software) are America's greatest trade prize. We are
creating jobs at three times the rate of the rest of the economy. We
bring in more international revenues than aircraft, more than agriculture, more than automobiles and auto parts. What is more astonishing and more valuable is that we have a Surplus Balance of Trade
with every single country in the world, while in 2000 this nation suf-

fered an unholy rise to almost $400 Billion in Deficits. No other
American business enterprise can make that statement, which is why
we represent an economic engine of growth that is the envy of the
known world. 99

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 60, at 2383-84.
Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 66-67.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 73.

99.

Online Entertainment and Copyright Law: Coming Soon to a Digital

Device Near You: Hearing on Serial No. J-107-9 Before the Senate Judicial
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 12 (2001) [hereinafter Online Entertainment Hearing] (prepared statement of Jack Valenti, Chairman and Chief
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"[I]f Copyright is allowed to decay," Valenti warned, "then this
nation will begin the slow undoing of an immense economic asset"-for who, he asked, "will invest huge amounts of private
risk capital in the production of films if this creative property
cannot be protected from theft?" 100 Hamilton, who worried continually about property rights, economic growth, and trade issues, 101 could not have said it better.
Such economic growth, however, needed congressional protection. Hilary Rosen warned that
[iun a global information network, protection of the creative materials
that are such a critical part of this country's economic backbone is
only as strong as the weakest link in the information communication
chain. Thus, there is an absolute necessity to eliminate existing gaps
in the international legal structure that undermine the protection enholders in national and international chanjoyed by U.S. copyright
102
nels of commerce.

Among economists, the figure who best expressed this perspective was Joseph Schumpeter. He argued that in the modern
world, innovation requires extremely expensive research and
development. Developing and then marketing a new product or
process requires massive resources, beyond those available to
small firms or private individuals. Large corporations that can
amass funds through the exercise of market power are in
Schumpeter's view the true sources of economic progress under
modern conditions. Schumpeter had quite possibly never heard
of Hamilton, but there is an obvious kinship. Today, economists
debate whether he was right about the positive correlation beand innovation, but his view contween market concentration
10 3
tinues to have support.
In this vision, the very forces that frighten the Jeffersonians are portrayed by Hamiltonians as sources of enlightenment and progress. Far from being the enemies of a rich and
diverse public discourse, large firms are the engines of progress-supplying the capital and expertise necessary to reach
global audiences with popular products. Similarly, major firms
Operating Officer, Motion Picture Association).
100. Id.
101. See JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 176-91.
102. See WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act Testimony, supra
note 83, at 44 (prepared statement of Hilary B. Rosen, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Recording Industry Association of America).
103. For discussion of Schumpeter's views, see Daniel J. Gifford & David
McGowan, A Microsoft Dialogue, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 619, 622-23 (1999);
Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justificationfor Intellectual Property,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 139-41 (2004).
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like Microsoft or Intel provide the world with the efficiencies of
industry standards, while financing the huge investments
needed to implement new ideas. 0 4 Again, broad economic conceptions help motivate neo-Hamiltonians' views of IP law in
general and its constitutional dimensions in particular. 105
This is hardly the right place (nor am I the right author) to
evaluate the competing economic models. The economic arguments on both sides are subtle and sophisticated. Despite some
brilliant efforts, economists still do not have a firm understanding of how IP rights and industry structure affect innovation.
Thus, even for those of us with Jeffersonian inclinations, the
Hamiltonian case cannot be rejected out of hand. Indeed, this
uncertainty about the economic issues may make the assignment of the burden of proof-and thus the choice of baselinesall the more important.
III. CHOOSING BASELINES
What is at stake in the IP debates, at least in part, is the
choice of baselines. Does the baseline consist of broad user
rights, which cannot be curtailed without compelling reason, or
of secure IP rights, whose investors must be securely protected?
Neither the Jeffersonians nor the Hamiltonians are content to look to popular opinion to set the baseline. Indeed, each
side fears that the popular culture's view of the baseline has
shifted against them. Consider Lawrence Lessig's lament that
the IP owners have already won the battle for the hearts and
minds of the American people:
The ordinary person believes, as Disney's Michael Eisner does, that
Mickey Mouse should be Disney's for time immemorial.... mhe ordinary person has become so accustomed to the idea that culture is
managed-that corporations decide what gets released when, and
that the law can be used to protect criticism when the law is being
used to protect property-that the ordinary person can't imagine the
world of balance our Framers created. 106

IP owners, however, fear that it is they who are losing the
battle for the hearts and minds of the public. Consider the view
104.

One imagines that the Jeffersonians use the Linux Operating System

while the Hamiltonians favor Microsoft Windows.

105. For a critique of Hamiltonian-like arguments regarding the benefits of
strengthened IP rights, see Lemley, supra note 103, at 132-41 (suggesting
that the arguments reflect a fundamental distrust of competitive markets-as
opposed to managerial discretion-as a means for allocating resources).
106. Lessig, supra note 26, at 1069. "Protect criticism" is probably a slip;
the context suggests that Lessig meant "suppress criticism" or the like.
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of Jack Valenti, speaking on behalf of the Motion Picture Association:
Creative property is private property. To take it without permission,

without payment to its owners, collides with the core values of this
society. Yet that is precisely what is happening. Otherwise rational
people who would not dream of stealing a videocassette off the shelf of
a Blockbuster store are using movies without permission or payment,
which is, for many, the assumed normality of current Internet behavior. It is estimated that today some 370,000 movies are being
downloaded, illegitimately, every day. By the end of the year it is esthat one million illegal downloads will take place every
timated
07
day.

Indeed, I have yet to meet anyone under thirty who sees any
moral problem with Napster or similar file-swapping systems.
Both sides are right to worry about the baseline. But note
that both sides also claim that their preferred baseline is not
just a vision of the future but one that deserves to be treated as
the status quo from which deviations must be judged. Lessig
appeals to the Framers' world of balance. He says that this balance characterized copyright law as recently as a generation
ago, until nefarious forces caused the balance to collapse.
Valenti invokes the "core values of our society," which he alleges are now grievously under attack. 0 8 These invocations are
rhetorically powerful because they appeal to our sense that
changes in the status quo need justification, and because they
link the speaker's preferred viewpoint to revered traditions.
These efforts to characterize positions as defending the status
quo against dangerous threats are also heartfelt on both sides,
not "mere rhetoric."
Yet oddly enough, while both sides insist they merely want
to defend the status quo, both are quick to proclaim that in reality the Internet is a whole new ballgame. Here's Jack Valenti
again: "The Internet, without doubt, is the greatest delivery
system yet known to this planet. It has the potential to reshape
how we communicate, how we buy and how to enlarge the dis10 9
patch of knowledge on a scale never before exhibited."
107. See Online EntertainmentHearing, supra note 99, at 12 (statement of
Jack Valenti, Chairman and Chief Operating Officer, Motion Picture Associa-

tion of America).
108. Id. Actually, all of society's core values seem to line up behind the content providers, they contend. In browsing through congressional testimony, I

was struck by the way they invoked not only property rights but also the
threats of terrorism and child pornography (yet another reminder that "there's
trouble right here in River City") as support for their legislative initiatives.
109. Digital Future of Movies, supra note 84, at 95 (statement of Jack
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On the other side, the Jeffersonians have waxed equally
enthusiastically about the novel possibilities of the Internet
and other digital technologies. For instance, postmodernists
and feminists have characterized the Internet and its hypertext
as inaugurating a new relationship between readers, authors,
and texts. 110 Others applaud the potential of the Internet to
empower new social movements that could not previously have
taken hold:
From neo-Nazism and Christian Identity to gay liberation and disability rights, from libertarians, home schoolers, and property-rights
enthusiasts, to environmentalists, Zaptistas, and anti-corporate activists, it is hard to find an aspiring social movement, new or old, of left,
right, or center, without a website, a bulletin board, and an e-mail
list."

Even observers who have concerns about potential negative
side effects of the Internet speak of the "astonishing opportunities" it offers 112 and of its "explosively changing social, economic, technological environment.""l 3
Although both sides agree that the digital age brings unprecedented possibilities, they identify conflicting potentialities. Because the new technological environment has crosscutting effects, the stakes in controlling that environment are
high. As Jack Balkin explains,
The digital revolution makes possible widespread cultural participation and interaction that previously could not have existed on the
same scale. At the same time, it creates new opportunities for limiting
and controlling those forms of cultural participation and interaction.
The digital age makes the production and distribution of information
a key source of wealth. Therefore it creates a new set of conflicts over
capital and property rights that concern who has the right to distribute and gain access to information.114

Valenti, President and Chief Executive Officer, Motion Picture Association of
America).
110. See generally Dan L. Burk, Copyright and Feminism in Digital Media
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
111. Seth K. Kreimer, Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social Movements
and the First Amendment in the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 119,
125 (2001).
112. CAss R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 203 (3d prtg. 2001).
113. Wagner, supra note 25, at 1026.
114. Balkin, supra note 1, at 3. Balkin takes the Jeffersonian side of this
conflict:
Thus, at the very moment when ordinary people are empowered to
use digital technologies to speak, to create, to participate in the creation of culture, and to distribute their ideas and innovations around
the world, businesses are working as hard as possible to limit and
shut down forms of participation and innovation that are inconsistent
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If these were indeed a "new set of conflicts," it would be surprising if they could be settled by routine application of an existing
legal regime grounded in an entirely different technological setting.
Because the Internet is such a radical new technology, it is
hard to see how we can meaningfully speak as if the rights of
users or content providers on the Internet had been determined
ahead of time. We cannot meaningfully translate copyright
rules to the digital world without considering the goals of the
copyright regime. For example, there is no inherent logical answer to whether file sharing of music is like loaning a CD to a
friend or like providing a facility for making hundreds of free
copies. Even if we were sure of how the old rules applied to
digital media, we might or might not want to follow them.
Copyright established a balance between providing incentives
to creators and empowering users. But simply transplanting
the same set of rules to the Internet might not achieve anything like the same balance (and indeed, the same balance may
or may not be appropriate). The dramatic increase in the potential for digital copying means that the same user rights cannot
coexist with the same incentives for creators as in earlier media.
At the same time as it created an argument for decreased
user rights to maintain producers' incentive, technology also
created counterarguments for broader user rights. The Internet
may create opportunities for forms of creativity that do not
need the economic incentive created by IP, of which one possi115 Furble example is the creation of open source software.
thermore, the increased potential for copying also expanded the
potential social value of a subset of those user rights (for example, by making possible the creation of online archives of historical materials). Thus, it is not entirely clear whether the
Internet calls for stronger IP rights or weaker ones. In short,
there is real work to be done in "translating" (or perhaps one
nondigital regime into the very difshould say "rewriting") the 116
ferent digital environment.
with their economic interests.
Id. at 15.
115. See Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the
Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002).
116. The translation metaphor is of course Lessig's. See Lawrence Lessig,
Translating Federalism:United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 130
(1995). Of course, unlike the metaphor, the activity is widely spread; many IP
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The juxtaposition of pleas for the status quo and celebration of profound newness is jarring. Imagine settlers disembarking from a space ship onto an uninhabited planet. With no
existing property regime on the planet, the settlers must draw
their own lines. They are unlikely to do so from scratch; instead, they will most likely borrow from the practices of their
home world to find a baseline in the new world. The trouble is
that if the new planet is really different from the old, the old
regime cannot be transplanted wholesale. Aspects of the regime
that were consistent in the old world-in our case, strong incentives to create new works and broad rights for individual
users of those works-may conflict in the new one, requiring us
to choose which aspects of the old world we want to extend by
analogy to the new. By picking and choosing, particular settlers
construct their own preferred vision of the "status quo," and
then accuse the other side of radical attacks on established
principle. Thus it is for the settlers of cyberspace. 117
Rather than confront this need for constructing a new regime out of parts of the old one, both sides of the digital debate
have tended to deny the need for change-constructing their
own version of the status quo to correspond with their desired
legal regime. One version stresses the economic entitlement of
creators to fair returns; the other stresses the legal entitlements of users to the public domain. Neither side can be fairly
accused of dishonestly manipulating rhetoric when they portray themselves as beleaguered defenders of the status quo. Instead, they both seem entirely sincere-indeed, adamant-in
their visions that it is they who are defending the true status
quo and their opponents who are nefariously undermining it.
For the same reason, each side seems honest in its belief that it
is the defender of expressive freedom and its opponent a threat
scholars are engaged in the effort at translation, of whom Lessig is only one.
117. A less fanciful example would be the problem of water use in the arid
western United States. As applied in England and in the East where water
was plentiful, the existing water law regime allowed economically beneficial
use of water while still according strong rights to downstream users. In the
West, however, use of water meant consuming it for agriculture or other purposes, depriving downstream users of access. A new water regime-prior appropriation law--evolved under these conditions. It limited previous riparian
rights (which are somewhat analogous to IP user rights). The situations are
quite different, of course, and there is no reason to think that the solution, i.e.,
stronger rights of appropriation, ought to be the same. The point instead is
that defining western water rights was not a matter of defending or attacking
some existing status quo of water rights, but of creating a new regime to govern new bodies of water in a different climate.
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to the rights of speakers. The disagreement over baselines
helps frame the whole debate: each side tries to convince the
other that its position is obvious and natural, whereas the
other side's is radical and contrived.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT GETS IN THE BASELINECONSTRUCTION GAME
It was inevitable that this growing dispute about IP rights
and their relationship to free speech would reach the Supreme
Court. When the Court did rule on the subject, Jeffersonians
were bitterly disappointed, believing the Court had upheld a
118 But in more subtle
blatant example of monopolistic greed.
ways, there were significant Jeffersonian elements in the
Court's analysis.
A. THE ELDRED LITIGATION
Eldred v. Ashcroft 1 9 involved the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), also known as the Sonny Bono law after one
of its inspirations. CTEA extended the copyright term by
twenty years, so that it is now in most cases the author's life
plus seventy years. Even more notably, the extension was retroactive, so that copyrights that were about to expire were
given a new lease on life. 120 Ably represented by Lawrence Lessig, the plaintiff in Eldred contended that the retroactive extension exceeded Congress's power under the Copyright Clause
and violated the First Amendment.
As the two dissenting opinions in Eldred make clear, the
121 The Constitution
"limited Times" argument has real bite.
purportedly only gives Congress the power to grant copyrights
for "limited Times."'122 Yet today, for all practical purposes, the

term might as well be forever. As Justice Stevens pointed out,
"only one year's worth of creative work-those copyrighted in
1923-has fallen into the public domain during the last 80

118. See generally Lawrence Lessig, How I Lost the Big One, LEGAL AFF.,
Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 57, 57.
119. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
120. For an overview of the debate over the CTEA prior to Eldred, see Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 413-22
(2002).
121. 537 U.S. at 223-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 242-67 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
122. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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years."123 CTEA assured that no other twentieth-century work

would enter the public domain. 124 The effect of CTEA will be, as
Justice Breyer explained, "the transfer of several billion extra
royalty dollars to holders of existing copyrights," 125 which obviously was not necessary to provide a retroactive incentive to
create those works. Justice Breyer also observed that CTEA
gave the average author 99.8% of the economic value of a perpetual copyright. 126 Also, it was no secret that some members of
Congress would have preferred a perpetual term. In fact, the
statute was named in honor of a member of Congress who
"wanted the term of copyright protection to last forever."'127
This is not a pretty picture.
Nevertheless, Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion rejected
the 'limited Times" argument. She relied on a history of previous retroactive extensions of the terms of IP protection and
viewed Congress's purported desire to harmonize copyright
terms with the European Union as a sufficient justification for
the change. 128 Fundamentally, the majority seemed to be unwilling to second-guess Congress in the inevitably uncertain
enterprise of setting the copyright term. If it had not been for
the history of prior retroactive extensions, the CTEA might
have been at more serious risk of being struck down.
The plaintiffs also made a First Amendment argument.
The extension of copyright terms had a significant effect on
speech, making it impossible to offer cheap editions of early
twentieth-century authors and hampering the ability to establish online archives with photos and letters from the same period. 129 If, as Justice Breyer plausibly argued, CTEA had little
123. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. On the positive side, the CTEA provides an indirect incentive to make
adaptations of the work of Jane Austen and Charles Dickens, since their novels can be used for free while later works by authors such as Hemingway and
Faulkner still have copyright protection and have to be paid for. If it weren't
for the CTEA, perhaps we would see adaptions of twentieth-century authors
instead of nineteenth-century ones-so perhaps the CTEA should be credited
with helping to keep the classics alive!
125. Id. at 249 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 255-56.
127. Id. at 256. Justice Breyer also expressed skepticism about the breadth
of copyright protection during his earlier career as an academic. See generally
Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs,84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
128. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 200-06.
129. Id. at 250-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting). It should be noted that even the
song "Happy Birthday to You," first copyrighted in 1935 but with a melody
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to offer in the way of countervailing benefit, this burden on
speech might seem hard to justify.
Yet Justice Ginsburg also rejected the First Amendment
claim. She declined the invitation to apply "a heightened form
of judicial review" to CTEA.13 Tracking language in earlier decisions, she relied on the purpose of the copyright law (which
she considered friendly to the First Amendment because it is
intended to promote speech), and on copyright law's "built-in
First Amendment accommodations."' 1 31 By the latter, she meant
the idea/expression distinction and the fair use doctrine, which
she characterized as allowing "considerable132'latitude for scholarship and comment,' and even for parody."'
This brings us to what is, for our purposes, the most significant passage in the opinion:
The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make-or decline to make-one's own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers
assert the right to make other people's speeches. To the extent such
assertions raise First Amendment concerns, copyright's built-in free
speech safeguards are generally adequate to address them. We recognize that the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights "categorically immune from challenges under the First

Amendment." But when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the
protection, further First Amendment
traditional contours of copyright
133
scrutiny is unnecessary.

This passage bears every sign of careful drafting. The thrust in
favor of immunizing traditional copyright is clear, but even
with regard to traditional copyright there are hedges: the First
Amendment "bears less heavily" (but still does presumably
bear somewhat?) and copyright's safeguards are "generally
adequate to address" free speech concerns (but perhaps not always?). Moreover, the Court spoke in terms of copying, which
suggests that more transformative uses might come out differently under the First Amendment. Most significantly, there is
the holding's limitation to cases where "Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection." The implication clearly seems to be that further First Amendment
scrutiny is in order when Congress has altered those contours.

many years older, remains under copyright today. Id. at 261.
130. Id. at 218-19.
131. Id. at 219.
132. Id. at 220 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. vs. Nation Enter.,
471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)).
133. Id. at 221.
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B. ELDRED AND THE BASELINE QUESTION
What makes Eldred particularly interesting for our purposes is its bearing on the baseline question. In its discussion of
the "limited Times" argument, the Court seems to adopt a
Hamiltonian perspective of broad congressional power to encourage investment in IP. At the same time, the Court disclaimed any real ability to determine the effectiveness of such
measures or whether they provide an excessive return to IP
owners. Correspondingly, the Court rejected Justice Stevens's
quite Jeffersonian plea to police against the monopolistic possibilities created by copyright. To the extent Lessig and his fellow
Jeffersonians were hoping to enlist the Court in an assault on
the moneyed interests of media corporations, they were necessarily disappointed. It would, however, have been surprising for
a court as conservative as this one to take up that task.
Having abandoned economics as a constitutional standard
for the scope of the IP Clause, the Court was then faced with
the speech issues. Once it had disclaimed any ability to judge
the fairness of the return to copyright holders, the Court could
not make the test for First Amendment validity turn on
whether the measure maintains fair returns for copyright holders. (Or rather, if it did, it would have had to withdraw from
the area entirely, leaving it up to Congress to decide on the
boundaries of copyright protection free from any judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment.) Instead, the Court resorted
to a baseline defined in terms of user rights. Those rights, according to the Court, are the limitation of copyright protection
to forms of expression as opposed to the ideas or facts communicated, and the availability of the fair use defense which "affords considerable 'latitude for scholarship and comment' and
even for parody."'134 After Eldred, it appears that these rights
have some First Amendment status.
The user-centered baseline is an important element of the
Jeffersonian perspective on IP. The idea is that user rights are
not leftovers, excluded from IP protection merely as inefficient
and unnecessary to maintaining the necessary incentive level.
Instead, the idea/expression distinction and the fair use defense
are portrayed as being exemplified by constitutionally prized
activities such as scholarship and comment, not to mention
parody.

134. Id. at 220 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers,471 U.S. at 560).
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Perhaps as important as its constitutional implications,
Eldred seems to have an important message in terms of interpretation of the copyright statutes. If these user-friendly doctrines are not merely gratuitous privileges granted by Congress, but instead are constitutionally rooted in First
Amendment values, it behooves courts to interpret them generously. Bearing in mind the free speech values of these exemptions could lead courts to steer away from some of the more expansive interpretations of copyright found in recent lower court
opinions. Indeed, the Court seems to have given lower courts a
strong signal to this effect. In a footnote discussing the plaintiff's attempt to distinguish his declaratory judgment action
from the defense of an infringement action, Justice Ginsburg
said: "In both postures, it is appropriate to construe copyright's
internal safeguards to accommodate First Amendment concerns."'135 This is a directive to interpret the statute to provide
liberal protection for these user rights. Hopefully, lower courts
will take the hint, as the Eleventh Circuit apparently has al136
ready done.
C. THE DMCA AND THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
The natural next question is: Where does Eldred's Jeffersonian baseline leave the DMCA at the dawn of the digital milit leaves the statute
lennium for which it was named? Clearly,
37
in a position of some constitutional risk.
Much may depend on how the courts ultimately assess the
factual justifications for the DMCA and its impact. That is a
topic that goes well beyond the scope of this Article. One plausible possibility is that courts may adopt something like this
middle-of-the-road assessment:
Industry representatives make personal digital copying sound like
Armegeddon [sic]. User advocates make Congress and the industry
sound like fascists or Javert-like monomaniacs. Both positions are exaggerated. The data do not justify the claim that consumer copying
will kill content. At the same time, the DMCA's effort to preserve a

135. Id. at 221 n.24. This statement is further confirmation that the Court
places serious weight on the First Amendment right to engage in fair use.
136. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263-65
(11th Cir. 2001) (citing Eldred and emphasizing the relevance of First
Amendment values in applying copyright doctrine).
137. See Pamela Samuelson, The Constitutional Law of Intellectual Property After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOc'Y U.S. 547, 567-74 (2003)
(suggesting that certain applications of the DMCA violate the First Amendment after Eldred).
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regime of contract and consent has a coherent ethical and economic
foundation, if a debatable one. Its contours may well need adjust38
ing.1

Of course, to the extent that a court does adopt the copying-asArmageddon or DMCA-as-fascism approaches, the level of scrutiny probably will not make much difference. But in what I
think is the more likely scenario--in which the question is trading off the statute's legitimate anti-infringement effects with its
questionable effects on fair use and use of public domain materials-the seriousness with which a court probes the factual issues could be crucial. Conventionally, courts approach the
question of how hard a look to take at the facts in terms of setting the 'level of scrutiny."
Before Eldred, commentators debated whether copyright
restrictions on speech should be considered content based and
therefore subject to some kind of heightened scrutiny. 139 Eldred
makes it clear that traditional copyright restrictions are not
subject to strict scrutiny, or even to a heightened form of the
scrutiny applied to content-neutral regulations. What is less
clear, however, is the level of scrutiny that applies when a
statute bars traditionally protected practices like fair use.
One possible line of argument is that the use of circumvention technologies is so intimately connected with fair use and
other protected uses that the restriction should be seen as
aimed directly at protected speech. One might analogize to the
Court's view that limits on political spending are worthy of
strict scrutiny because the ability to engage in political expression is so tightly connected with access to funding. 140 Of course,
there's an empirical assertion here about the need to use circumvention technologies to engage in fair use that would need
proof. Consider a statute that prohibited reproduction of excerpts of speech by any mechanical means such as a Xerox or
word processor, even when the speech is in the public domain,

138. David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 MO. L. REV. 1,
70 (2004).
139. See Baker, supra note 53; Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom
of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147
(1998); Netanel, supra note 44, at 28; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the FirstAmendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001).
140. For an overview of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence on
campaign financing, see DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 243-59
(2d ed. 2003). Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), establishes that restrictions
on expenditures are subject to strict scrutiny, just like content-based restrictions.
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or when the copying is for a legitimate purpose that outweighs
its economic impact on the original author. This seems to be a
restriction on speech at least as powerful as a spending limit,
and much more worthy of judicial scrutiny than the typical
time, place, and manner restriction. To the extent that the level
of scrutiny is just a legalistic way of asking, "How worried
should we be about this statute?" there seems to be a good argument for setting the level of scrutiny fairly high.
Another line of argument would support treating the
DMCA as content neutral. 14 1 It is true that the DMCA is in
some sense concerned with content-the idea is to promote the
use of certain digital technologies to distribute content, while
banning the use of countertechnologies-but the statute's basic
justification is as a means of enforcing the copyright laws. Eldred makes it clear that the copyright laws, though arguably
content based themselves, raise no constitutional red flags. On
the other hand, Eldred strongly indicates if it does not actually
hold, that doctrines like fair use are rooted in the First
Amendment. Thus, even if it is considered content neutral, the
DMCA burdens speech and is subject to First Amendment scrutiny.
This second line of argument would result in the application of the O'Brien test. 142 This test first calls for courts to identify a legitimate purpose unrelated to content, to test the
means to ensure that they are not unnecessarily burdensome
on speech, and to determine whether ample alternative channels for speech remain open. This test has been applied with
various degrees of vigor, often amounting to a free pass for the
government but sometimes involving real scrutiny into the
choice of legislative means.143
Parsing terms like "content neutrality" is unlikely to definitively establish the level of scrutiny. Although the courts
will probably announce that they are applying some specified
level of scrutiny, the determining factor is likely to be the statute's potential impact on speech values. Whatever the rubric,
courts should examine the DMCA with care for two reasons.

141. It is important, in this setting, to realize that the Court has not been
successful in providing a crisp definition of content-based regulation. See
FARBER, supra note 140, at 27-31. Thus, whether to treat the DMCA as content based (or as equivalent to a content restriction) cannot simply be decided
by application of a clear-cut test.
142. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
143. For discussion, see FARBER, supra note 140, at 25-26, 54-55, 179-82.
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First, if the academic commentators are to be believed, the
DMCA's potential for restricting speech far exceeds the kinds of
traditional content-neutral rules that the Court has reviewed
(e.g., limitations on the locations of parades, the use of sidewalks for leafleting, and the like). 144 Given their potentially
pervasive impact on traditional speech rights, statutes such as
the DMCA deserve closer scrutiny than a ban on leafleting outside the door of a post office. Second, even when it applies content-neutral review, the Court has done so with particular vigor
when a regulation shuts off a traditional channel of communication. Given Eldred's characterization of the long-standing exceptions from copyright protection, fair use and other protected
uses seem to qualify as "traditional channels" as much as frontyard lawn signs, for example. 145 If the DMCA shuts off these
traditional channels, it would seem to qualify for more vigorous
review.
The standard of review question is difficult because copyright, like the DMCA, is an awkward fit with the content distinction that purportedly drives the standard of review. It does
not suffer from the core vices of content-based regulation.
Copyright and the DMCA protect expression indiscriminately,
with no favoritism toward a particular viewpoint or subject
matter. Yet, they are not exactly content neutral either. They
are both deeply concerned with content, and their central purposes focus on the content of speech--encouraging more and
more original content. Copyright's various exemptions also are
connected with content, such as the idea/expression distinction. 146 Rather than squeezing copyright within these classifications, Eldred seems to view it as sui generis. 147 This is true of
the DMCA as well.

144. See also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (upholding
the city's limit on decibel level for amplifiers in Central Park); Heffron v. Int'l
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding a limitation on placement of booths at a state fair).
145. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994) (striking down content-neutral ban on lawn signs in residential areas because this closed off a
traditional mode of communication).
146. Lemley and Volokh argue against treating copyright as a time, place,
or manner restriction on similar grounds. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note
139, at 702-13.
147. Perhaps copyright infringement, like obscenity, should just be considered a traditional category of unprotected speech. Just as in the case of obscenity, however, the Court should be careful not to allow the unprotected category
to expand beyond its traditional boundaries.
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In the end, it is unlikely that the fate of the DMCA will be
determined by subtle arguments about levels of scrutiny. It is
more likely to hinge on the strength of two other factors. The
first factor is simply the strength of the empirical case against
the DMCA: How much protected speech is impinged? How
strong is the justification? Is the remedy unnecessarily sweeping? In Eldred, the majority seems not to have appreciated the
negative impact of CTEA on speech. Although Lessig is probably wrong to blame himself for failing to emphasize this fact, he
is right that this had some influence on the result. 148 Whether
the courts see the DMCA's broad sweep as really burdening
speech, and whether they find a real justification for that broad
sweep, are probably critical to the ultimate decision on its constitutionality.
The other factor that will drive the decision on the DMCA
is the extent to which the Court ultimately accepts the Jeffersonian baseline. Eldred makes it clear that the traditional
copyright limits have constitutional significance, if only to
mark the limits of copyright's First Amendment "safe harbor." 149 It is also fair to see in Eldred, particularly in its emphasis on fair use and the idea/expression distinction, a view
that the traditionally exempted uses have important First
Amendment value. Eldred's discussion of these exempted uses
is in the service of an argument in favor of the First Amendment acceptability of the copyright system as a whole. This
suggests that the exemptions themselves are important to the
148. See Lessig, supra note 118, at 57 (2004). Lessig went on to lament
that:
Defeat brings depression. They say it is a sign of health when depression gives way to anger. My anger came quickly, but it didn't cure the

depression.
It was at first anger with the five conservatives. It would have
been one thing for them to have explained why the principle of Lopez
didn't apply in this case. That wouldn't have been a very convincing
argument, I don't believe, having read it made by others, and having
tried to make it myself.... These justices in particular have repeatedly said that the proper mode of interpreting the Constitution is
"originalism".
Where was their "originalism" now?
Id. at 63. Lessig unnecessarily blames himself:
That "grand experiment" that we call "the public domain" is over ....
When I can make light of it, I think, "Honey, I shrunk the Constitu-

tion." But I can rarely make light of it. We had in our Constitution a
commitment to free culture. In the case that I fathered, the Supreme
Court effectively renounced that commitment. A better lawyer would
have made them see differently.
Id.
149. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003).
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validity of the whole system, and that a system of IP protection
that lacked these protections would be suspect. If so, incursions

on these rights should require exceptional justification. Hence,
the Jeffersonian baseline ought to be taken seriously, and the
courts should view government incursions on that baseline

with real skepticism. 150
As this discussion indicates, I am skeptical of the utility of
the Court's current framework for analyzing First Amendment
issues. In particular, it is doubtful that the Court's framework

will generate clear answers to issues about IP rights. Thus,
current doctrine seems somewhat dysfunctional to me as an
analytical construct. But the doctrine is an effort to get at an

important question, which is how much we should distrust
various forms of regulation bearing on speech. Thus, the problem is not that different laws warrant different levels of scrutiny, but that it is difficult to formulize the complex and sometimes elusive question of how hard a judge should look at a
particular statute's justifications.
Assuming the Court does take a hard look at the DMCA,
how will the statute fare? This will depend on a factual record
that does not yet exist. 15 1 Congress seems to have had qualms
about the effects of the statute on legitimate users of digital

150. In a thoughtful analysis of free speech and copyright prior to Eldred,
Neil Netanel argued for application to copyright issues of a heightened version
of O'Brien scrutiny, using the Supreme Court's opinions on regulation of cable
television as a model. See Netanel, supra note 139, at 54-59, 69-85. The Supreme Court rejected that argument in Eldred, instead creating a safe harbor
for traditional copyright doctrine. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218-21. But, as we have
seen, the Court did not explain what happens outside of that safe harbor. See
supra Part IV.B. In the context of nontraditional restraints on users, Netanel's
proposed test seems plausible and is not foreclosed by Eldred. Admittedly, Eldred does reject the cable television cases as models for this form of scrutiny in
copyright situations. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220. But this doctrinal hook is
not essential to the argument in favor of the O'Brientest.
151. For a suggestion of how the DMCA's legislative history cuts, see
Netanel, supra note 139, at 77-81. One question that comes to mind concerns
the difference between the availability of exemptions to the use prohibition
and their unavailability for the distribution prohibition, which means that an
exempted use may be impossible as a practical matter unless the user is in a
position to create its own circumvention technology. Would it really be impractical to make circumvention technology available under careful restrictions to
libraries and other possible sets of restricted users? (For example, the anticircumvention technology itself might be guarded by another layer of anticircumvention technology to which only exempted users would be given access.)
Another question is whether the anticircumvention ban will really be effective
against its primary target of large-scale copying, or whether its effect will be
disproportionately felt by legitimate users.
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materials, providing administrative rule making by the Librarian of Congress as a remedy. In any event, if the DMCA is to
survive scrutiny post-Eldred, there must be a showing that its
extraordinary breadth is warranted by need to prevent wholesale infringement. 15 2 The harsh academic criticism of the
DMCA suggests that the statute may not fare well in this inquiry. 153 Given the Jeffersonian baseline for user rights
adopted in Eldred,54 the government bears the burden of satisfying the Court that copyright's 'built-in accommodation" of
free speech has not been fatally undermined.
CONCLUSION
Rob Merges has remarked on the crucial role that conceptual frameworks like those discussed in this Article have
played in shaping IP law:
There are no natural facts to act as a brake on expansive notions of
how broad a right might be, how many people and activities it might
reach, or how long it might last. This is of more than passing interest.
It means that what brakes and limits there are in this domain exist in
our minds, or are encoded in the conceptual rules and principles that

152. An alternative ground of attack would look, not to the effect of the
DMCA on users, but to its effect on the dissemination of circumvention software (viewing such code as a form of speech). The Second Circuit rejected that
argument in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, holding that the DMCA
had a sufficiently strong justification for imposing a restriction at least on
forms of distribution aimed to providing run-able code rather than designed to
be read by other programmers. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). Recall Lessig's description of software as "machines made of words." Lessig, supra note 26, at
1063. To the extent that the regulation covers the machinelike aspect of software, rather than its wordlike aspect, First Amendment concerns do not seem
serious. The question of how the First Amendment applies to software has,
however, given rise to considerable debate and cannot be fully addressed here.
For further discussion, see Lee Tien, PublishingSoftware as a Speech Act, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 629 (2000).

153. Netanel, supra note 139, at 81 (viewing the DMCA as "highly vulnerable" under his test and speaking of the statute's "questionable premises" and
"fatally capacious scope"); see also Netanel, supra note 44, at 28 ("[t]he anticircumvention provisions should not survive Turner scrutiny (or, for that matter, any other form of intermediate scrutiny) . . . "). But opinions about the
DMCA do differ. A critical but more restrained view is found in Pamela
Samuelson, Toward a "New Deal" for Copyright in the Information Age, 100
MICH. L. REV. 1488 (2002). The spectrum also includes some supporters of the
statute. See Raymond T. Nimmer, First Amendment Speech and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act: A Proper Marriage, in COPYRIGHT AND FREE
SPEECH-COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES (Johnathan Griffiths

& Uma Suthersaner eds., forthcoming Feb. 2005), at ssrn.com/abstract=
572886.
154. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.
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comprise this body of law. Any change in the fundamental underpinnings of the rules thus has potentially serious implications.165

With the Internet and other digital technologies, these are not
merely arcane legal issues of interest to a few industries. What
is at stake is not merely a clash of viewpoints, but the legal
structures that may govern much of the economy and our communal lives.
Given the potential stakes, it is not surprising that the
views of scholars and other commentators about the scope of IP
law and its constitutional implications are driven by more than
disagreements about doctrine or empirical evidence. They implicate broad conceptions of how the economy works, how power
is distributed in society, and how individuals can best flourish
under contemporary conditions. These are perennial disputes,
pitting those who trust institutions against those who stress
individualism. Moreover, these fundamental questions seem
especially acute when new territories (geographical or technological) open up. Of course, the policy issues are likely to be
more nuanced than the rhetoric may suggest, but advocates
have a natural tendency to invoke these core values on one side
or the other. For these reasons, it is understandable that today's debate resonates so closely with one of the formative episodes in American history: the battle between Hamilton and
Jefferson over the future shape of American government and
society.
As we have seen, key elements of that early dispute are reflected in today's IP debate, especially in the positions taken by
public intellectuals and political actors. On the one hand, we
have the neo-Jeffersonians. Like Jefferson, they distrust monopolies and concentrated economic power, for fear that the
economically powerful will control public life. They celebrate
individualism, both as an intrinsic value and as a key to innovation and growth. Also like Jefferson, they seek to limit federal regulatory power. And like Jefferson, they are fond of celebrating the virtues of free speech and free thought. In contrast,
the neo-Hamiltonians favor aggressive government action to
promote economic growth. They view large institutions as essential to the contemporary economy and find the Jeffersonians' individualism romantic at best. Realists to the end, they
think the best way to encourage desirable activity is not to
limit its regulation, but to make it profitable.
155. Merges, supra note 42, at 2239.
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Because much of the current debate over IP involves conflicting worldviews rather than isolated empirical or theoretical
disagreements, it is accurate to characterize this aspect of the
debate as ideological. But this should not be taken to impugn
the intellectual seriousness of the debaters. The dispute between Hamilton and Jefferson was also ideological, yet the two
are among the most powerful thinkers we have ever had in
public life. Moreover, while the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian
perspectives represent poles of the debate, many scholars fall
somewhere in the spectrum between those poles or stress different dimensions of IP issues. Thus, the debate is much more
than a collision of two opposing dogmas. Nevertheless, the Jeffersonian/Hamiltonian dispute described in this Article reflects
deeper disagreements about public values and social realities,
and illuminates current debates over IP issues in general.
Specifically, these two viewpoints embody different ideas
about the relationship between the First Amendment and IP
law. Under the Jeffersonian view, much of IP law is deeply
suspect because it authorizes powerful actors to control speech
and innovation. By seizing part of the public domain of expression, copyright and its extensions raise fundamental First
Amendment issues. Under the Hamiltonian view, however, IP
law (and copyright in particular) works in tandem with the
First Amendment to encourage expression and new ideas, and
any conflict between them is inconsequential and tangential. So
far, the Supreme Court has agreed with the Hamiltonians by
finding copyright and the First Amendment to be fundamentally amicable. But it has also accepted a key aspect of the Jeffersonian framework by defining the First Amendment baseline
to include rights of fair use and the idea/expression distinction.
That Jeffersonian baseline may present First Amendment barriers to Hamiltonian projects such as the DMCA. Clearly, it is
too early to know how this will all unfold.
In the short run, Jefferson was the clear victor over Hamilton. The Federalist Party was crushed and the Democrats
reigned triumphant. In the longer run, it may be closer to the
truth to say that Hamilton won. Today's powerful federal government is Hamilton's legacy rather than Jefferson's, complete
with the Federal Reserve System-the modern day equivalent
of the Bank of the United States. Technological and economic
changes vanquished Jefferson's dream of a small America and
his constitutional vision of restricted federal authority, although not his passion for individual rights. In short, he was
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defeated not by Hamilton but by the Industrial Revolution. We
are facing another round of fundamental technological and economic changes as we move past the industrial era. It remains
to be seen whether Jefferson or Hamilton will be the victor this
time around.

